INVOX

Security & Trust Center

Method: every claim on this page is checked directly against the current codebase or an internal engineering document — the same rule this project uses for its E-Invoicing Coverage Matrix. Where INVOX has not built something yet, or has only a partial version of it, this page says so in plain prose instead of a vague marketing phrase. INVOX holds no third-party security certification (no SOC 2, no ISO 27001, no PCI-DSS) today. Anything below that sounds like a certification is a description of an internal architecture or process, not an audited certification — do not read it as one.

Access Control (RBAC)

The customer portal has three roles — admin, user, viewer — enforced by a fail-closed permission table in the account database layer: an unrecognized role or permission always resolves to "denied," never "allowed." Named permissions today cover managing users, managing/viewing API keys, and managing the account. This is portal-user RBAC — a separate mechanism, described next, scopes what an individual API key can do.

API Key Scopes

Sub-API keys (customer-issued keys scoped under a tenant's master key) carry one or more of 14 named scopes — validate, evidence, explain, autofix, mail, read_only, keys, transmit, extract, report, billing, generate, convert, webhooks — enforced centrally by a default-deny scope middleware in the API layer: every authenticated /v1 route is either mapped to a required scope or explicitly marked open, so a newly added route can never ship silently unscoped. A sub-key missing a scope gets a distinct INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE error rather than a generic "unauthorized," so integrators can tell "wrong key" from "right key, missing permission."

Key rotation: master and sub-keys do not currently support in-place rotation (issue-a-new-secret-under-the-same-id). Today, rotating a compromised or expiring key means revoking it and issuing a new one. Treat this as not yet implemented, not as an existing capability.

IP Allowlisting

Two independent mechanisms, with different scope — do not conflate them:

Authentication: OIDC, SAML, SSO

These are two separate systems solving different problems — INVOX does not have one unified "enterprise SSO" story, and this page will not describe it as one:

Audit Logs

Be precise about what this is. GET /v1/audit/verify and GET /v1/audit/report let an external party — an auditor, a certification body, or a customer — confirm that INVOX's internal tamper-evident hash chain is intact, and learn which standards/engine/rule versions produced a given verdict. This is content-free by construction: the chain stores hashes, counters, and version strings, never invoice content or personal data. This is not a full user-activity audit log (a chronological "who clicked what, when" feed for a tenant's own portal users) — INVOX does not currently expose one. If you need per-user activity history for your own compliance program, ask; today it does not exist as a customer-facing feature.

Zero-Retention (Data Handling)

This is one of INVOX's more distinctive, verifiable architectural properties, documented end-to-end in an internal zero-retention audit (result: PASS as of its last run). Concretely, invoice bytes are:

Country-pack validators (e.g. the German rule pack) parse the submitted bytes to an in-memory XML tree and discard the byte buffer once parsed. Company tax identifiers supplied at registration (VAT-ID / Steuernummer) are stored as a salted one-way hash, never in raw form.

Encryption

TLS: INVOX's own container/API layer is designed to run behind a TLS- terminating proxy (INVOX's internal OWASP ASVS self-assessment marks this "TLS-ready" — the container itself exposes plain HTTP internally, with TLS termination expected at the reverse-proxy/load-balancer layer, per the EU deployment guide). At-rest encryption of the underlying disk/volume is an infrastructure-level (hosting-provider) property rather than something enforced by INVOX application code — we are not going to claim a specific at-rest cipher or key-management scheme here without a concrete, independently checkable implementation to point to. If your compliance process requires attestation of a specific encryption-at-rest mechanism, ask — this page will be updated once one is verifiable in the codebase, not before.

Webhooks: Signing, Replay, SSRF, Circuit-Breaking

Outbound webhook delivery is HMAC-SHA256 signed — every delivery carries X-Invox-Signature: sha256=<hex digest>, verified with a constant-time comparison on the receiving side. Delivery is also protected by:

Rate Limiting, Timeouts, Request Hardening

INVOX's request-hardening layer enforces: a per-key sliding-window rate limit (default 300 req/min, configurable), a hard cap on total request body size (default 80 MB, rejected from Content-Length before any multipart is streamed to disk), a request wall-clock timeout so a slow/stuck request cannot pin a worker, and a standard set of hardening response headers (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, Referrer-Policy, cross-origin isolation headers, etc.). Inbound files additionally pass through the NOX Gate, INVOX's inbound-file security gate — rate limit, replay-window + nonce check, content-type allowlist, filename guard, size cap, magic-byte detection, XXE/DOCTYPE rejection, and a compression-bomb check — fail-closed, before the validator subprocess is ever reached.

Data Residency / EU Hosting

INVOX's EU deployment guide documents a European deployment path (Docker-based, with pinned/checksum-verified KoSIT, XRechnung-configuration and Mustang (ZUGFeRD/Factur-X) JAR dependencies fetched and verified rather than bundled, for license compliance). If a specific hosting region or provider commitment matters for your procurement process, confirm the current production hosting location directly — this page documents the documented deployment path, not a live infrastructure inventory.

DPA, TOMs, Subprocessors

A draft Auftragsverarbeitungsvertrag (AVV) — the German-law equivalent of a Data Processing Agreement under Art. 28 GDPR — exists. It is explicitly marked in the document itself as a draft template requiring legal review before use with customers ("ENTWURF — VOR VERTRAGSSCHLUSS MIT KUNDEN ANWALTLICH PRÜFEN LASSEN"). It describes the processing as transient, in-memory validation with zero-retention of invoice content. Treat the AVV/DPA as in progress, not as a finished, counter-signable legal instrument, until that legal review is complete. A dedicated, standalone subprocessor list is not currently published; ask directly if you need one for a vendor-risk review.

Backup & Disaster Recovery

There is no dedicated, standalone backup/disaster-recovery runbook today. INVOX's internal incident-response runbook covers operational incident classes (validator unavailable, elevated error rates, evidence-PDF generation issues) and remediation steps, but a formal RPO/RTO-stated backup-and-recovery plan is not yet documented — state this as a gap rather than implying coverage that doesn't exist in writing.

Incident Management

The internal incident-response runbook defines a four-tier severity classification (P1: service unreachable, immediate response — down to P4: UI/evidence-PDF issue, next business day) with per-incident-class runbook steps for the on-call operator. This is an internal operator runbook, not a published customer-facing SLA or breach-notification commitment; if your contract requires a specific breach-notification timeline, that belongs in the DPA/AVV negotiation, not this page.

Certifications

None held today. No SOC 2 report, no ISO 27001 certificate, no PCI-DSS attestation. Invoice-format validation itself is standards-based rather than self-certified: XRechnung and ZUGFeRD/Factur-X validation runs the official KoSIT and Mustang tools as subprocesses (not a reimplementation), and EN16931 rule IDs are mapped against the CEN TC 434 semantic model. INVOX keeps an internal certification-readiness breakdown of what is subprocess-verified versus what would require a separate, paid conformity assessment (e.g. formal EN16931/PEPPOL AP certification, which INVOX has not commissioned) — ask if you need it.


Questions about anything on this page, or need something not covered here (a specific encryption-at-rest attestation, a subprocessor list, a signed DPA) — ask directly. This page will be updated as real capabilities ship, not ahead of them.

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